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In the 2000 presidential election, African Americans made up only
16% of the voting population in Florida but cast 54% of the ballots rejected in automatic machine counts (“machine-rejected ballots”).1
Across the state, automatic machines rejected 14.4% of the ballots
cast by African Americans, but only 1.6% of the ballots cast by others.2 Racial disparities appeared even when the same voting technol* Cf. Langston Hughes, I, Too, in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
LITERATURE 1258 (Henry Louis Gates Jr. & Nellie Y. McKay eds., 1997) (“I am the darker
brother. They send me to eat in the kitchen when company comes. . . . Tomorrow, I’ll be at
the table when company comes. Nobody’ll dare say to me, ‘Eat in the kitchen,’ then. . . . I,
too, am America.”).
** Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. Several people read earlier drafts of this Essay and provided helpful comments, including Richard Banks, Roger
Fairfax, Floyd Feeney, Heather Gerken, Lani Guinier, Bill Hing, Kevin Johnson, Tom Joo,
Pamela Karlan, Kenneth Mack, Cynthia Overton, Leslie Overton, Marc Spindelman, Madhavi Sunder, and Tobias Wolff. This Essay also benefited from the author’s conversations
with Diane Amann, Holly Doremus, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Reggie Oh, Joseph
Singer, and Terry Smith, as well as from the outstanding research assistance of Russell
Johnson and Johanna Berta. Special thanks to Jim Rossi, Richard Hasen, Jason Kellogg,
and Amanda Keener.
1. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE
2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (2001) [herinafter U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS] (“Approximately 11 percent of Florida voters were African American; however, African Americans cast about 54 percent of the 180,000 spoiled ballots in Florida during the November
2000 election based on estimates derived from county-level data.”); Josh Barbanel & Ford
Fessenden, Racial Pattern in Demographics of Error-Prone Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,
2000, at A25 (reporting that “black voters made up 16% of the vote on Election Day”). In
compiling the data, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights relied on the percentage of registered voters in Florida who were African American (11%), U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra, at 2, whereas The New York Times relied on the percentage of those who voted on
election day who were African American (16%), Barbanel & Fessenden, supra, at A25.
2. Katharine Q. Seelye, Divided Civil Rights Panel Approves Election Report, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2001, at A8 (reporting on a study conducted by Allan J. Lichtman, a history
professor at American University and an elections expert); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 2 (showing that across Florida, ballots cast by African Americans were almost ten times more likely to be rejected than the ballots of whites); see also U.S. to Look
Into Possible Irregularities at the Polls, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2000, at 9 (reporting on a computer analysis finding that “the more black and Democratic a precinct, the more likely a
high number of presidential votes was not counted”). Studies have shown that racial disparities in uncounted votes also exist outside of Florida. See, e.g., David Stout, Study Finds
Ballot Problems are More Likely for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2001, at A9 (reporting on a
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ogy was used. For example, counting machines rejected punch card
ballots in predominantly African-American precincts in Miami-Dade
County at twice the rate they rejected ballots in predominantly Latino precincts, and four times the rate they rejected ballots in predominantly white precincts.3
In their discussions of Bush v. Gore,4 legal academic commentators have not grappled with the significance of the racial disparities
reflected in machine-rejected ballots. Despite the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court permanently halted the manual count of these ballots,5 doctrinal analysis employing the facts as framed by the Justices
has, by and large, commanded the most attention.
study conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives Government Reform Committee
that found “the votes of poor people and members of minorities were more than three times
as likely to go uncounted in the 2000 presidential election.”).
3. Barbanel & Fessenden, supra note 1, at A25.
The impact of these differences on the outcome will never be known but their
potential magnitude is evident in Miami-Dade County, where predominantly
black precincts saw their votes thrown out at twice the rate as Hispanic precincts and nearly four times the rate of white precincts. In all, [one] out of
[eleven] ballots in predominantly black precincts were rejected, a total of 9,904.
Id.; see also Kim Cobb, Black Leaders Want Action on Florida Vote Complaints, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 30, 2000, at A24 (“U.S. Rep. Corrine Brown, D-Jacksonville, said that 16,000
of the 27,000 ballots left uncounted in Duval County were from predominantly black precincts.”); U.S. to Look into Possible Irregularities at the Polls, supra note 2, at 9 (“In MiamiDade, the state’s most populous county, about 3 percent of ballots were excluded from the
presidential tally. But in precincts with a black population of 70 percent or more, about 10
percent were not counted.”). The disparity between African Americans and whites with regard to machine-rejected ballots was higher than racial disparities in the use of punch card
technology. Barbanel & Fessenden, supra note 1, at A25 (observing that “64[%] of the
state’s black voters live in counties that used the punch cards while 56[%] of whites did
so.”). But see Stephen Ansolabehere, Voting Machines, Race, and Equal Protection, 1
ELECTION L.J. (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that nationally, no significant correlation exists
between race and punch card machine-rejected ballots).
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5. The discussion of race has been more extensive outside of the legal academy. See,
e.g., Common Cause v. Jones, No. 01-03470 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 24, 2001) (alleging disparate voting procedures disadvantage racial minorities in violation of equal protection); U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 1 (2001); Ansolabehere, supra note 3 (political scientist’s study of race and voting technology); Barbanel & Fessenden, supra note 1, at A25. A
few legal commentators have touched upon the relevance of race. See, e.g., Heather
Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard Hasen’s and Richard Briffault’s
Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 422-23 (2001) (“The Court’s failure to
wrestle with these questions—what does equality mean, and how far should we go to attain it when the twin problems of race and poverty permeate our democratic structures?—
gives an unwarranted patina of legitimacy to the election system.”); Pamela S. Karlan,
Nothing Personal: The Evolution of The Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno To
Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1366-67 (2001).
There is credible evidence that systems that disproportionately reject votes
both have a racially disparate impact and are more often used in the populous
jurisdictions in which minority voters are concentrated. Thus, the newest equal
protection once again vindicates the interests of middle-class, politically potent
voters, while ignoring the interests of the clause’s original beneficiaries.
Id.; Richard A. Posner, Florida 2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 14 (engaging in a statistical analy-
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Without a consideration of race, however, the conversation about
Bush v. Gore remains woefully incomplete. Politics and race in the
United States have characteristics that sometimes overlap.6 Issues of
racial identity and racial differences necessarily evoke questions of
representation in the political process, particularly among groups
that have been historically excluded. Because of the unique role of
race in American politics, an examination of race yields important
insights that might otherwise go unnoticed.
While this short Essay does not comprehensively analyze all of the
components of race in Bush v. Gore, the piece does use race to address normative assumptions about democracy embedded in the
opinion.7 The use of a racial framework shows how these assumptions adversely impact racial minorities and other Americans as well.
Professor Briffault acknowledges that the five U.S. Supreme Court
Justices who voted to discontinue manual counting of the ballots in
Bush v. Gore deviated from the Court’s trend of including previously
excluded groups in the political process.8 In a similar spirit, Professor
sis and observing that “the larger the black population and the lower the literacy level, the
higher the incidence of undervotes even after other factors are taken into account.”).
6. Cf. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (forthcoming Feb.
2002) (manuscript at 9, on file with author) (“[W]e begin by reclaiming the idea of race
from its current, artificially limited conception as an exclusively individualistic form of
personal identity. Rather than see race as merely denoting the biological facts of ancestry,
we seek to deploy race as a proxy for political status.”); Vikram David Amar & Alan
Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 976 (1998) (analyzing recent jurisprudence, and observing that “[t]he Supreme Court has dismissed the
group dimension of political rights only, it appears, where race is involved”); Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 191 (1994) (“The race of
the voters matters in North Carolina precisely because the black voters have voted consistently against the racial politics of North Carolina’s Congressional Club and Republican
Party.”); Lani Guinier, [E]racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV.
109, 130 (1994) (“In other words, minority group representation is not purely cultural, historical, or biological; it also has a political component. Group members may identify collectively along a common axis and organize to promote common interests in ways similar to
other political associations.”); Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and
Law, 75 OR. L. REV. 647, 697 (1996) (asserting that “[i]dentity politics have been crucial
and perhaps inevitable responses to perceived oppressions”).
7. Cf. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER xvi (2d ed. 2000)
(asserting that a view from the “margin” allows one to understand both the center and the
margin of society, and provides a sense of wholeness); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
928, 950-51 (2001) (“Critics of liberal theory, including critical race theorists, have offered
another way to think about promoting equality and human dignity, one that reflects the
perspective of the subordinated.”); Spencer Overton, Fannie Lou Hamer Wouldn’t Like
This, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at B11 (discussing the Fannie Lou Hamer standard,
which considers the campaign finance system from the perspective of a poor woman of
color like Fannie Lou Hamer).
8. Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 325, 347-49, 372 (2001) (describing Bush v. Gore as quite different from the Court’s
earlier inclusionary equal protection cases). Professor Gerken observes that the majority
mistakenly believes itself to be agnostic, and she identifies many of the problems that re-
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Hasen asserts that Bush v. Gore’s break from past cases may “ease
the way for future Supreme Court majorities to pursue their own visions of political equality without much thought about whether that
vision is supported by existing case law.”9 This Essay agrees with
Professors Briffault and Hasen to the extent that they suggest that
Bush v. Gore rejected more inclusionary assumptions about democracy articulated in earlier cases, but also asserts that the Court embraced merit-based assumptions that conditioned political recognition on an individual voter’s capacity to produce a machine-readable
ballot.10 The use of race reveals how both the focus on individual responsibility and the expressive harm of exclusion that accompany the
merit-based vision pose unique problems in the context of voting.
Though some might argue that taking race into consideration is
inappropriate in a “colorblind” society,11 a consideration of race need
not entail the employment of a “race card” that trumps all other concerns and singularly insists on race-specific solutions. Instead, just
as decisionmakers balance such concerns as individual rights, economic efficiency, and general welfare,12 race can be used as one analytical tool to be considered in conjunction with other factors. Some
might assert that race is irrelevant to an analysis of the machinerejected ballots, preferring instead to attribute responsibility to voter
inexperience, voter illiteracy, and substandard voting equipment in
particular jurisdictions.13 These explanations, however, are not prepolitical or randomly distributed throughout society but disproporsult from the Court’s failure to explicitly anchor its decision in a concrete, normative theory of democracy. Gerken, supra note 5, at 415. This Essay attempts to identify some of the
unstated assumptions underlying the perspective of the majority per curiam and its defenders and begins to address some of the thornier normative issues embedded in the decision.
9. Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 380 (2001).
10. See infra Part I (discussing meaning of inclusionary and merit-based visions of
democracy).
11. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)), for
the proposition that “our Constitution is color-blind.” But see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting
in part and concurring in part) (noting that “no decision of this Court has ever adopted the
proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind”).
12. See JOSEPH SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 279-82 (2d
ed. 1997) (describing the use of various policy considerations as analytical tools in lawmaking).
13. See, e.g., Ansolabehere, supra note 3 (arguing that nationally, no significant correlation exists between race and punch card machine-rejected ballots and that racial disparities are explained by a higher percentage of less reliable punch card technology in AfricanAmerican precincts); Abigail Thernstrom & Russell G. Redenbaugh, The Florida Election
Report: Dissenting Statement, at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/final_
dissent.htm (asserting that the problems encountered during the Florida election were
caused by bureaucratic inefficiencies, inexperienced voters, illiterate voters, substandard
voting technology, and other issues unrelated to race).
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tionately impact certain populations due in part to past statesponsored racial discrimination.14 A consideration of race allows
scholars and legal decisionmakers to avoid the pitfalls of the “colorblind card,” an ideological extreme that mechanically trumps historical considerations, silences discussion, removes relevant issues from
the table, and ignores important problems.
Part I of this Essay reviews two opposing visions of democracy
that emerged in Bush v. Gore. The Florida Supreme Court’s more inclusionary vision prompted it to order that the ballots rejected by
machines be counted manually, while the U.S. Supreme Court’s more
merit-based vision motivated it to prohibit a manual count of the imperfectly marked ballots. Part II uses race to reveal many of the
shortcomings of the merit-based vision of democracy. Although the
Court’s facially neutral, merit-based criteria focus on individual responsibility, they interfere primarily not with individual rights, but
with the ability of groups of voters like African Americans to identify
with one another as a political community, to create alliances with
others of different backgrounds, and to use the vote to enact political
change. Further, the lens of race exposes how merit-based criteria
convey an expressive harm of exclusion that carries particular potency in light of a history of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices used to suppress political participation by African Americans.
While the merit-based vision’s adverse impact on African Americans
should prompt concern in and of itself, Part III explores how the
shortcomings of the merit-based vision adversely impact other
Americans.15
I. COUNTING VOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEMOCRACY
Other commentators have recognized that one’s choices regarding
the law of the political process are shaped by one’s assumptions
about democracy, which reflect the individual’s understanding about
particular cultural, professional, and social realities of politics.16 Two
14. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 291 (1969) (invalidating
county’s literacy test in part because the county’s previous maintenance of a de jure segregated school system had “deprived its black residents of equal educational opportunities,
which in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test”).
15. This Essay concentrates primarily on African Americans due to the high rate of
machine-rejected ballots among African Americans. As developed in Part III, however, the
experience of African Americans can be used as a lens to reveal structural problems with
the merit-based assumptions of the Court that impact many others, including but not limited to Latinos, the elderly, and the poor.
16. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 444 (1989) (observing that with regard to
issues “soaked with political interest[,] . . . legal argument and judicial explanation
. . . unselfconsciously reflect underlying assumptions about actual and potential social
relations, and about the institutional arrangements and forms of political life fit for
those relations as they are and are capable of becoming”); see also James A. Gardner,
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different understandings of democracy animate the judicial opinions
in Bush v. Gore—an inclusionary vision and a merit-based vision.
The inclusionary vision of democracy values widespread participation and looks to remove criteria or conditions that act as barriers to
such participation.17 Under this vision, political participation is a
right, and courts and democratic decisionmakers have a responsibility to create an environment that allows for, and even encourages,
participation by all citizens.18 Professor Briffault, for example, lists
the legislative apportionment cases and the invalidation of the poll
tax to illustrate the inclusionary nature of the Court’s jurisprudence
prior to Bush v. Gore.19 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, which bans
literacy tests and fluency in English as prerequisites for voting,20 and
Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconstruction of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 897 (1997) (“We can hardly expect
to figure out what voting—or ‘fair’ voting, or ‘meaningful’ voting—means without some
conception of what voting is for, what purpose it serves within a larger regime of democratic self-government.”); Spencer Overton, Rules, Standards, and Recounts: Form and the
Law of Democracy, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001) (observing that one’s assumptions about democracy shape one’s preference for using rules or standards to allocate
discretion); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001)
(describing judicial culture as “the empirical assumptions, historical interpretations, and
normative ideals of democracy that seem to inform and influence the current constitutional
law of democracy”).
17. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 45 (1991) (describing the “inclusionary understanding
of democracy” in amended section 2 to the Voting Rights Act); cf. Gardner, supra note 16,
at 904 (describing democratic theory in which “exclusion from the electoral process is exclusion in the deepest possible sense from the essence of American society”).
18. See Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, in LAW’S CENTURY (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming 2001) (observing that, within a political conception of racial justice, American democracy is charged with three tasks: to maintain “equal and meaningful
access for vulnerable racial publics” to institutions in which political identity is formed, to
“modify the participatory practices through which” the political opinions of vulnerable racial publics “can be framed and communicated,” and to “insure that the interests of vulnerable racial publics are represented in institutional arenas in which binding collective
choices are discussed and made”).
19. Briffault, supra note 8, at 347 nn.103-04 (citing Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975)
(concluding that a Texas provision impermissibly disenfranchised otherwise qualified voters solely because they had not rendered their property for taxation); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (invalidating a provision excluding nonproperty owners
from voting in an election to approve general-obligation bonds); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969) (concluding that a Louisiana provision limiting the right to vote on the
issuance of revenue bonds to taxpayers violated the Equal Protection Clause); Harper v.
Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll taxes). But cf. Ball v. James,
451 U.S. 355 (1981) (concluding that a state could rationally limit voting in a water district
election to landowners and that each vote could be weighted respective to the amount of
land each voter owned); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (rejecting the argument that Harper allows Congress to restrict political expenditures); Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 726-30 (1973) (concluding that a
property-based scheme for electing the governing board of water reclamation district does
not violate equal protection).
20. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (1994) (suspending use of literacy
tests nationwide); id. § 1973b(f)(1)-(2) (2001) (prohibiting English-only elections and other
voting qualifications or prerequisites intended to deny language minorities the right to
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the Twenty-fourth Amendment, which prohibits exclusion from federal elections “by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax,”21
also embrace inclusionary notions of democracy. Proposals for public
financing of politics fit into this category as well.22
The majority of the Florida Supreme Court embraced inclusionary
assumptions about democracy in its conclusion that a “legal vote”
constituted any ballot upon which the clear intent of the voter could
be ascertained.23 While the Florida court’s articulation of the “clear
intent standard” was based on state statutory language,24 the state
vote). But cf. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (upholding a literacy test that did not have a discriminatory effect because “[t]he ability to
read and write . . . has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of
the ballot”); Hasen, supra note 9, at 397 (“[Lassiter] is of questionable value following cases
like Harper. . . . But if Lassiter remains good law, it stands for the proposition that the
state can condition the franchise on voters’ ability to follow instructions—thereby insuring
that only educated voters vote.”).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
22. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-27 (1996).
This Article argues for a new system of campaign finance. . . . Under this plan,
each voter would have the opportunity to contribute vouchers to candidates or
to interest groups in every federal election cycle. The interest groups would use
the vouchers to contribute to candidates or to organize independent expenditure campaigns. With limited exceptions, only funds from the voucher system
could be spent to support or oppose candidates for elected federal offices.
Id. at 6; Bruce Ackerman, Crediting Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13
AM. PROSPECT 71, 78-79 (1993); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1204, 1204 (1994) (“The Constitution of the United States should contain a principle,
which I shall call ‘equal-dollars-per-voter,’ that would guarantee to each eligible voter
equal financial resources for purposes of supporting or opposing any candidate or initiative
on the ballot in any election held within the United States.”).
23. See Briffault, supra note 8, at 372 (arguing that although it was not constitutionally mandatory, the Florida court’s order was consistent with the inclusionary thrust of the
United States Supreme Court’s prior application of the Equal Protection Clause in the voting rights area); Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth
Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 587, 598-99 (2001) (asserting author’s
belief that “as a matter of Florida law, the ‘clear intent of the voter’ standard meant that
many of the ballots that were out of strict compliance with Florida law were nonetheless
legal votes,” but noting that if such ballots did “not contain legally cast votes, then a recount process that includes them might infringe upon the voting rights of those citizens
who did comply with the state’s requirements”).
24. In ordering a manual recount of ballots on which automatic machine recounts had
failed to detect a vote for President and which had not yet been manually recounted, the
Florida Supreme Court embraced phrasing established by the Florida Legislature. The
statute provided that “[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing board.” FLA. STAT. §
101.5614(5) (2000), amended by 2001 Fla. Laws ch. 40, § 37, at 144, 145. According to the
Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provision, legitimate votes included not only
ballots completely punched through, but also all ballots that expressed the clear intent of
the voter. The Florida Supreme Court stated that the “clear message from” the legislature
was “that every citizen’s vote be counted whenever possible,” thereby imputing an inclusionary understanding of democracy to the Florida Legislature. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1254 (Fla. 2000), rev’d sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Thus, the court
required canvassing boards and officials to count a vote if there was a “clear indication of
the intent of the voter” on the ballot, unless it was “impossible to determine the elector’s
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court noted that it had, in the past, “pointed to the ‘will of the voters’
as the primary guiding principle” in resolving election disputes.25 In
prior cases it “repeatedly held . . . that so long as the voter’s intent
may be discerned from the ballot, the vote constitutes a ‘legal vote’
that should be counted.”26 Rather than emphasizing the shortcomings
of voters, the Florida court focused on the responsibility of the state
and mentioned that the margins of error for punch card machines
might be so significant as to require a reevaluation of the use of the
machines.27 In short, a majority of the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the Florida statutory scheme as containing a broad, inclusive
definition of a vote that put responsibility on state officials to manually review ballots that lacked machine-readable markings. United
States Supreme Court Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens either agreed with or were prepared to defer to this interpretation and would have allowed a manual counting of the ballots.28
In contrast to the inclusionary vision of democracy, the meritbased vision conditions the right to political participation on a citizen’s ability to comply with a particular set of criteria.29 A meritchoice.” Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5)-(6) (2000)). The Florida Supreme Court may
have focused on the legislative standard cognizant of earlier questions expressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices as to whether the Florida Supreme Court based an earlier
holding on state constitutional provisions rather than state legislative provisions or,
through interpretation, “changed” the law in violation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of
the U.S. Constitution. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 145 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that “[i]n light of our previous remand, the Florida Supreme Court may have been
reluctant to adopt a more specific standard than that provided for by the legislature for
fear of exceeding its authority under Article II”). Note that inclusionary objectives were not
absent in the consideration of the statutory structure containing section 101.5614(5), Florida Statutes. See, e.g., Letter from Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor, State of Florida, to Members of the Florida Senate and House of Representatives (Mar. 15, 1977) (on file with the
Florida State Archives) (observing shrinking voter participation nationally, and suggesting
that electoral reform was needed that will “heighten public interest and participation” and
“enhance[ ] the ability of citizens to exercise their right to vote”).
25. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1254.
26. Id. at 1256; see also id. at 1261 n.20 (observing that “[t]his presidential election
has demonstrated the vulnerability of what we believe to be a bedrock principle of democracy: that every vote counts”).
27. Id. at 1261; see also id. at 1254 (asserting that the right to vote is not just the
right to participate and to speak, “but more importantly the right to be heard ” ) (emphasis
in original).
28. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ.) (“Thus, nothing prevents the majority, even if it properly found an equal protection violation, from ordering relief appropriate to remedy that violation without depriving
Florida voters of their right to have their votes counted.”). Justice Souter stated that he
would defer to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of a legal vote, establish uniform
counting standards, and allow the State to count the machine-rejected ballots. Id. at 13135. (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Breyer, J.).
29. Cf. Jacob Katz Cogan, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473 (1997) (monitoring the nineteenth century shift
in locating a person’s capacity for political participation externally in material things like
property to internal characteristics such as literacy, and the continued disenfranchisement
of women and African Americans); Michelman, supra note 16, at 480-85 (discussing en-
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based vision is individualist to the extent that an individual citizen
rather than government has a responsibility to secure or meet the
conditions necessary for his or her political participation.30 The
merit-based vision of democracy also enhances societal well-being,
the argument goes, because better political decisions arise from an
electorate made up of citizens who are either competent enough or
care enough to meet the criteria.31 Examples of devices that have
been considered legitimate under merit-based assumptions about

franchisement on the basis of competence); James Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and
[Mis]representation: Part II—Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision of the Right to Vote,
43 HOW. L.J. 405, 452-55 (2000) (discussing the merit-based approach as applied to voting).
While the merit-based and inclusionary visions differ, they are not mutually exclusive,
and both might be embraced in varying degrees. For example, while the Florida Supreme
Court employed a more inclusionary vision than the U.S. Supreme Court, the state court’s
order would have been even more inclusionary had it, in addition to ordering a manual review of undervotes, ordered a manual review of overvotes. Also, many merit-based practices may not have been repudiated due to a rejection of merit, but because the practices
arbitrarily excluded many who were believed just as competent or interested in making political judgments. In other words, the argument goes, the devices were not sufficiently precise in their task of allocating membership in political community based on merit. See
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV.
893, 896 (1998) (“We have rejected [poll taxes, property qualifications, and literacy tests]
not because we have come to believe their aim of ensuring the independent exercise of political judgment is not worth pursuing [but] . . . because we have come to think that some
people had misappropriated these practices to unjustly exclude groups that were just as
capable as the rest of us of exercising this kind of judgment. Their central democratic aim
remains untarnished.”).
30. Cf. R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending ClassBased College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1036 (2001) (“Meritocracy is individualist
insofar as it seeks to distribute opportunities and resources on the basis of the conduct or
attributes of individuals. It is productivity-oriented to the extent that it distributes opportunities and resources based on predictions of future performance that will enhance societal well-being.”).
31. Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 171 (“The true reason of requiring
any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so
mean a situation that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had
votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or other.”);
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 684-85 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
[I]t is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about
public affairs to pay $1.50. . . . [I]t was probably accepted as sound political
theory . . . that people with some property have a deeper stake in community
affairs, and are consequently more responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of confidence, than those without means, and that the
community and Nation would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.
Id.; Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52 (1959) (“Yet in our
society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other printed matter canvass and debate
campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise
the franchise. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed
to insure an independent and intelligent exercise of the right of suffrage.”).
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democracy include poll taxes, literacy tests, and a privately-funded
campaign finance system.32
As acknowledged by Professors Briffault and Hasen, the five U.S.
Supreme Court Justices who voted to discontinue manual counting of
the ballots did not adopt the Florida Supreme Court’s inclusionary
language.33 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas adopted a more merit-based interpretation that put responsibility on the voter to produce a ballot that
could be read by a properly functioning counting machine. The per
curiam opinion repeatedly emphasized the failure of those who cast
machine-rejected ballots in its reference to punch cards that “have
not been perforated with sufficient precision” and were “not punched
in a clean, complete way by the voter” due to either “error or deliberate omission.”34 Upon its conclusion that the clear intent standard
lacked uniformity in its application and violated equal protection, the
Court did not order a manual count of ballots based on a uniform
standard. Instead, the Court prohibited any further recognition of
the imperfectly marked ballots by asserting that the Florida Legislature preferred to submit the state’s presidential electors by December
12.35 A separate concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
32. Some have asserted that racial and gender exclusions were merit-based devices
that excluded those who were not deemed sufficiently independent and competent to make
political decisions. See Ortiz, supra note 29, at 908-09 (“Many believed that freed blacks
were uniquely vulnerable to their former masters, employers, or opportunistic whites, and
women were thought to be easily swayed by their husbands.”).
33. Briffault, supra note 8, at 372 (describing Bush v. Gore as quite different from the
Court’s earlier inclusionary equal protection cases).
34. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000); cf. Oral Argument Tr. at 58, Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (indicating a question of Justice O’Connor as “Well,
why isn’t the standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I
mean, it couldn’t be clearer. I mean, why don’t we go to that standard?”).
35. The Court stated that the Florida Legislature preferred to conclude the vote tabulation process by December 12 in order to secure a federal statutory guarantee that Congress would not challenge its election results. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109-11. But see Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 675
(2001) (observing that the two Florida Supreme Court opinions cited by the Court do not
“supply any authoritative pronouncement that December 12 is the absolute deadline for
state law purposes”). The majority reasoned that Florida could not possibly tabulate the
votes in accordance with minimal constitutional requirements by the deadline, and thus
reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s manual recount order. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at
109-11. If imperfectly marked ballots contained votes as legitimate as perfectly marked
ballots, then presumably equal protection guarantees would have required a manual review, and such constitutional concerns would have trumped any federal statutory deadline.
Cf. Briffault, supra note 8, at 359 (“If equal protection guarantees applied to imperfectly
marked ballots, then presumably even ‘the press of time’ would not have justified the failure to review them.”); id. (“[T]here was nothing in the per curiam opinion that indicated
that a voter who casts any particular sort of imperfectly marked ballot had any substantive
entitlement to have that ballot treated as a valid vote.”). But see Hasen, supra note 9, at
389:
Nonetheless, the Court held that the Florida Legislature’s interest . . . in taking
advantage of the “safe harbor” provisions of federal law for counting the state’s
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Scalia and Thomas explicitly concluded that the Florida statutory
scheme required counting only the ballots on which chads had been
punched completely by voters.36
According to the merit-based assumptions of political participation underlying the majority’s opinion, voter intent was less important than voter compliance. If a voter did not “properly” mark his or
her ballot in a manner that machines could read, more pressing concerns outweighed a manual review of the ballot. The Court extended
a conceptual understanding of formal equality to invalidate the use
of the clear intent standard. At the same time, the Court used the
seemingly natural and logical cultural values of merit to limit the
protection afforded by its particular brand of equality to machinereadable ballots.37 Capacity to punch a ballot so as to completely remove a chad constituted a relevant criterion that the Court used to
define the political community.
II. MERITOCRACY THROUGH THE LENS OF RACE
By employing a seemingly neutral, merit-based qualifier to identify those ballots that deserve recognition, the Court in fact avoids
deeper and more difficult normative questions about structural inequalities in our political process. This Part employs race to illuminate some of the more troubling implications of the merit-based vision.
A. Race Exposes the Shortcomings of the Merit-Based Vision’s
Individualized Focus
The lens of race reveals that the merit-based vision’s individualized focus overlooks both the collective nature of political participation and the structural nature of racial disadvantage.

electoral votes trumped the rights of all Florida voters to have valid votes
counted. It is not self-evident that such a state interest was compelling and
trumped the right, recognized in Reynolds but ignored by the Court in Bush v.
Gore, to have every vote count . . . .
36. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 120-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (concluding that
“there is no basis for reading the Florida statutes as requiring the counting of improperly
marked ballots” based on an opinion by Secretary of State Katherine Harris and an argument that the statutory provision was inapplicable because it allegedly applied only to
damaged or defective ballots, not ballots imperfectly marked by voters). The concurrence
reasoned that the clear intent of the voter was irrelevant and that the Florida Supreme
Court’s flawed interpretation changed Florida election laws in violation of Article II of the
U.S. Constitution. See id. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
37. The Court did not extend its conceptual understanding of equality to require that
all voters have access to similar types of voting machinery. See id. at 109 (“The question
before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections.”).
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In the absence of a racial analysis, the Court’s merit-based criteria may appear neutral, reasonable, and benign. Because the Court
gave all eligible Florida citizens the formal opportunity to vote on
roughly the same terms, each Floridian had an equal opportunity to
participate. The fact that some individuals were better able to follow
instructions and perform the simple tasks necessary to produce a
machine-countable ballot reflected differences in voter motivation,
voter education, or voter experience.38 Individuals with greater education and wealth are more likely to participate in politics generally,39 one might argue, and it is not surprising that these individuals
were more likely to cast machine-readable votes. From this perspective, no outcast or disenfranchised groups existed that required protection. Instead, there were only responsible individuals whose political entitlement was threatened by the claims of those who failed
to exhibit an appropriate amount of personal responsibility.
While the simple task of punching a ballot may not appear to be a
significant barrier for any individual voter, the merit-based vision
fails to recognize that politics involves not simply individual rights
but also associational and structural concerns.40 Although individuals
38. Cf. Dana Canedy, Florida Governor Calls Commission Report on Election Biased,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at A22.
Gov. Jeb Bush’s office sent a scathing letter to the United States Commission
on Civil Rights today denouncing its preliminary findings on the problemplagued presidential race in Florida last November. The letter dismissed the
investigation’s findings as irresponsible and biased. . . . Mr. Bush’s letter took
aim at many of the findings, including the issue of widespread disenfranchisement among minority voters. The letter said that, as with all voters, minorities
could have been affected by a number of variables that the commission failed to
take into account, such as “the voter’s education level, the voter’s experience
with voting, the ballot design and the voting machine used.”
Id.
39. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF
NOVEMBER 1998, at 7 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/
p20-523.pdf (“In 1998, citizens who had bachelor’s degrees were nearly twice as likely (58
percent) to report that they voted as those who had not completed high school (30 percent).
At each level of educational attainment from high school completion and above, voting
rates increase significantly.”); John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda Powell & Clyde Wilcox,
Individual Congressional Campaign Contributors: Wealthy, Conservative and ReformMinded, Individual Donors and Campaign Finance 13 (1998), at http://www.
opensecrets.org/pubs/donors/donors.htm (providing that, of contributors to the 1996 congressional elections who responded to an academic survey funded by the Joyce Foundation,
81% had annual incomes over $100,000 and 20% had annual incomes higher than
$500,000).
40. Compare Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964) (describing voting rights as
“individual and personal in nature”), with Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and
Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1595
(1993) (suggesting “that the one-person, one-vote doctrine is consistent with both group
and individual conceptions of voting”), and Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2282 n.30
(1998) (asserting that one-person, one-vote cases like Reynolds “should be viewed as cases
about group political power . . . rather than purely about individual rights”).
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cast votes, individual voters enact political change by associating
with political groups.41 Under a constitutive understanding of voting,
the experience of participation in politics is valued “as a process of
formation or field of exertion of self or community” through which
“persons or communities (or both, reciprocally) forge identities.”42
Voting is seen as a “vehicle for self-development and identification,
and a means for creating alliances and thus a community among individuals so engaged.”43
The Court’s seeming unwillingness to recognize these values in
Bush v. Gore is especially evident when one considers race. In its focus on individual responsibility,44 either the Court fails to consider or
is indifferent to the manner in which its merit-based criteria interfere with the ability of voters like African Americans to identify with
one another as a political community, create alliances with others of

41. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The concept of ‘representation’ necessarily applies to groups:
groups of voters elect representatives, individual voters do not.”); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Supreme Court and Reapportionment, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S, at 57, 59 (Nelson W. Polsby ed., 1971) (“We have, since Madison, realized that people tend to act politically not so much as individuals as in groups.”); Anthony A. Peacock, Voting Rights, Representation, and the Problem of Equality, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION:
SHAW V. RENO AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING RIGHTS 17 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1997) (“Although representational politics is necessarily group oriented—groups of voters electing
representatives, not individuals—the individual right to vote must be respected in any system of representation.”); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted
Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1742 (2001) (“[I]f we are going to recognize an aggregate
harm like dilution, we must take into account its group-like qualities.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 884 (1995) (“[T]he right to effective voting is incomprehensible without that conception of the group.”).
42. Michelman, supra note 16, at 451.
43. Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV.
491, 513 (2000).
44. The merit-based vision’s focus on individual responsibility is not inconsistent with
the concentration by some Justices on the individual characteristics of voting. See Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 917 (1996) (“To accept that [a remedial] district may be placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote (to cast a
ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to its individual
members. It does not.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (explaining that a
state may not create voting districts on the basis of race because “[g]overnment must treat
citizens as individuals”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647-49 (1993) (describing harms that
arise from districting based upon groups and not individuals); see also Amar & Brownstein,
supra note 6, at 917 (criticizing “the Court’s exclusively individualistic perspective” in the
voting and jury contexts); Gerken, supra note 41, at 1665-66 (describing the “highly individualistic view of rights developed by the Rehnquist Court”); Guinier, supra note 40, at
1601 (referring to “the efforts of some members of the Court to characterize representation
as an exclusively individual notion”); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is
Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1996) (criticizing the Court’s application of its general
equal protection doctrine, which focuses on individual rights, to the voting context);
Tucker, supra note 29, at 410 (claiming that the majority in Shaw v. Reno “assumed that
the right to vote was an individual, and not a group right”).
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different backgrounds, and use the vote instrumentally to enact political change.45
By limiting the relevant political community to those who exhibited the capacity to create a machine-readable ballot, the Court’s decision diluted the political choices of both African Americans whose
ballots were rejected by machines and African Americans who properly punched their ballots but identified politically with those whose
ballots were rejected.46 African Americans who exhibited the capacity
to punch ballots were no longer allowed to aggregate their preferences with those excluded by the Court’s ruling.47 While the Court
justifies its decision on a lapse in individual responsibility, its decision penalizes all African Americans who identify as part of a political group equally, with no distinction between those who did or did
not completely punch their ballots. The Court did not individually
reprimand those who failed to punch the ballot properly and who
most probably do not even know of their transgression. Whereas a
more inclusionary vision would have allowed African Americans to
more freely forge a common identity and exert some degree of collective self-determination in improving their lives through shaping the
political environment,48 the merit-based vision disabled a critical device used to engage in these activities.
The Court’s failure to recognize this dilution of political strength
as illegitimate arises, in part, from a related problem of the meritbased vision’s focus on individuals. The merit-based vision fails to
adequately appreciate that racial disadvantage arises not simply
from isolated, intentional actions of malicious individuals but also
45. Cf. Roberts v. Wamser, 679 F. Supp. 1513, 1532 (1987), rev’d on standing grounds,
883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989) (concluding that election board’s failure to manually review
punch card ballots rejected by tabulating equipment constituted a violation of the Voting
Rights Act because such a failure results “in the City’s black voters having less opportunity
than other members of the City’s electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice”).
46. Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered TwoParty Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 51 (1998) (“Blacks have historically functioned as a party
within a party. Even during the era of limited black enfranchisement, blacks formed
‘satellite’ or ‘parallel’ parties to advance their interests within the two-party structure.”).
47. Gerken, supra note 41, at 1669-70 (distinguishing vote dilution claims from claims
based on conventional individual rights by observing that with regard to voting: “fairness
is measured in group terms; an individual’s right rises and falls with the treatment of the
group; and the right is unindividuated among members of the group”); Tucker, supra note
29, at 414 (“When an electoral scheme systematically prevents the collective exercise of
voting rights for particular groups, the individual right to vote is diminished accordingly.”).
48. Even after reviewing all of the imperfect votes, no undisputed winner of the 2000
presidential election emerged. Dennis Cauchon & Jim Drinkard, Florida Voter Errors Cost
Gore the Election: Bush Still Prevails in Recount of All Disputed Ballots, Using Two Most
Common Standards, USA TODAY, May 11, 2001, at 1A (finding that had all disputed ballots been counted by hand, George W. Bush would have won under two of the most widely
used standards for counting votes, Al Gore would have won under the two least used, and
that overall, most voters intended to vote for Gore).
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from structural factors that fail to account for context and history.49
The merit-based vision seems to assume that constitutionally sufficient equity exists in the status quo—that the baseline has some degree of fairness. Under these assumptions, differences in political
outcomes that result from ballots not counted by machines do not reflect past discrimination but rather differences between autonomous
individuals. Whereas the inclusionary vision actively seeks and removes context-specific obstacles to political participation, the meritbased vision fails to question whether its facially neutral criteria
have a disparate impact upon certain populations. The merit-based
vision either ignores or tolerates that factors such as lower education, a greater percentage of first-time voters, a greater reluctance to
ask for assistance, segregated residential patterns, and substandard
voting equipment and assistance at the polls in predominantly
African-American neighborhoods are not fully pre-political or meritbased50 but stem in part from illegitimate factors such as past statesponsored racial discrimination.51
49. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824-25 (1995) (“The substantive approach sees the disestablishment of ideologies and systems of racial subordination as indispensable and prerequisite to individual human dignity and equality. The nonsubstantive approach sees the individual right to be treated without reference to one’s race as primary.”); cf. Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT xiii, xxiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (“The debate that ensued in
light of this different orientation engendered an important [Critical Race Theory] theme:
the absolute centrality of history and context in any attempt to theorize the relationship
between race and legal discourse.”).
50. Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379 (1988)
(“The rationalizations once used to legitimate Black subordination based on a belief in racial inferiority have now been reemployed to legitimate the domination of Blacks through
reference to an assumed cultural inferiority.”); id. at 1370 (“Throughout American history,
the subordination of Blacks was rationalized by a series of stereotypes and beliefs that
made their conditions appear logical and natural.”).
51. Cf. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206
(describing one factor used to determine a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as
“the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision
bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process . . . .”);
Lawrence, supra note 7, at 953 (“[The liberal theory] makes no effort to inquire into the
ways that current facially neutral practices may have a foreseeable and unjustifiable discriminatory impact or to account for unconscious bias in their administration.”); Spencer
Overton, Voices from the Past: Race, Privilege, and Campaign Finance, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1541 (2001) (observing that the existing distribution of property upon which the privatelyfunded campaign finance system is based is not pre-political, but is shaped in part by past
state discrimination). Judges and other decisionmakers’ assumptions about the democratic
process are likely shaped, in part, by preferences and judgments about race. If one subscribes to a colorblind ideology and believes that race is irrelevant outside of intentional
actions by malicious individuals, merit-based assumptions about democracy that happen to
exclude people of color may seem more logical. If one has a more expansive view that appreciates the structural nature of race, one might adopt more inclusionary assumptions
about the nature of democracy.
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In short, the merit-based vision isolates broader structural concerns, both about historical disadvantage and contemporary racial
identities, because its individualized focus is not sufficiently expansive to take the broader problems into account.52 The narrowness of
the merit-based vision, however, should not suggest that it is a neutral or impartial tool completely removed from political outcomes.53
B. Race Exposes Particular Expressive Components
of Merit-Based Vision
In addition to exposing the merit-based vision’s failure to appreciate the unique characteristics of voting that extend beyond the individual, a consideration of race allows one to more broadly comprehend the expressive effect of the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.
Voting’s expressive component “rests on the message the electoral
system is understood to disseminate, and accordingly represents
something bestowed on the political community.”54 To members of the
majority of the Court, the Florida Supreme Court’s manual recount
order sent a message of haphazardness and arbitrariness that was
“not well calculated to sustain the confidence that all citizens must

52. Cf. Tucker, supra note 29, at 453 (“The individual portrait . . . is very ill-suited for
the political landscape in which voting occurs. . . . [P]oliticians are keenly aware of the racial, social, political, and economic characteristics of voters, and redraw district boundaries
to comport with those groups they believe will best enhance the political strength of themselves or their party.”).
53. See Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 32
(1987) (“The unstated point of comparison is not neutral, but particular, and not inevitable,
but only seemingly so when left unstated.”); see also e.g., Banks, supra note 30, at 1034
(“Merit is a functional concept—no quality or characteristic is inherently meritorious.
Merit is necessarily defined with respect to particular contexts, goals, and values.”); Jamin
B. Raskin, Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 HOW. L.J. 521, 551 (1995) (“Merit is
neither self-defining nor self-revealing; it is an ever-changing concept that is historically,
socially, and institutionally contingent—and often contested. It is impossible to define
merit without asking what kinds of institutions we want to have and for what purposes.”);
Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias and Merit, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1449, 1503 (1997) (“Reason and merit are culturally and ideologically specific constructs
that depend on a particular ideological discourse and can adjudicate only for those who
subscribe to that ideology.”).
54. Katz, supra note 43, at 513 n.119; see Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes,
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520 (2000)
(“On the rights and equality side of constitutional law, [expressive] theories assert that
state action is required to express the appropriate attitudes toward persons.”). Some might
suggest that the consideration of race in analyzing the Court’s decision to exclude the imperfectly marked ballots is dangerous because such an analysis might send the message
that individuals are less competent in political participation simply because of race. Cf.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (“Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of
lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.”). But see Lawrence,
supra note 49, at 838 (“The colorblind race baiter completes his white supremacist wizardry by blaming affirmative action itself for creating hostility, resentment, and racial divisiveness.”).
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have in the outcome of elections.”55 The message sent by such a recount would cast “a cloud” over the “legitimacy” of the election and
might threaten democratic stability.56 The Court, however, did not
explore the message sent by its merit-based qualifier that resulted in
imperfectly marked ballots being disregarded.
The expressive harm that the Court’s exclusion of the ballots generated is especially potent when one examines the problem through
the lens of race. Recognizing that a “voter is a full member of the political community,”57 the dismissal of the imperfectly marked ballots
sends a message of exclusion from the political community.58 Exclusion from the political process conveys a form of second-class citizenship on those who are excluded.59 Historically, election administra55. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“The contest provision, as it was mandated by the State Supreme Court, is not well calculated to sustain the confidence that all
citizens must have in the outcome of elections.”).
56. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring with the
Court’s order to stay the manual count of ballots).
The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view threaten
irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the country, by casting a cloud upon
what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election. Count first, and rule upon
legality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election results that have the
public acceptance democratic stability requires.
Id.
57. Karlan, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that voting “announces that the voter is a full
member of the political community”); see also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA:
EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION 93 (1989) (“Voting . . . is an assertion of belonging to a political community.”); QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965-1990, at 15-16 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.,
1994) (noting that the right to vote “confer[s] full citizenship on the members of the
group”); JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 26 (1991);
Gardner, supra note 16, at 906 (“To seek the vote is to seek formal recognition as a full
member of society; to be denied the vote is to be either excluded altogether from membership in the community or consigned to some kind of second-class citizenship.”); Pamela S.
Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 179-82 (1989) [hereinafter Karlan, Maps
and Misreadings] (discussing the symbolic value of civic inclusion).
58. Cf. Katz, supra note 43, at 512-13 (“Denial of the vote is tantamount to exclusion
from the community or relegation to second-class citizenship, with the message of exclusion being the primary harm produced.”).
59. See Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory: Where Do We Go From
Here?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE
283, 284-85 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1993). The Voting Rights Act:
is premised on a broad vision of political equality and empowerment. The vision
of empowerment anticipated an electorate actively participating in policy reform, not merely reconfigured districts that ensure legislative voting privileges
for a few black elected officials. The vision imagined a transformative politics
that would value political participation for its own sake in order to recognize
the autonomy and dignity of black voters. Participation would affirm their
status as first-class citizens in a democracy.
Id.; KARST, supra note 57, at 94 (“Voting is the preeminent symbol of participation in the
society as a respected member, and equality in the voting process is a crucial affirmation of
the equal worth of citizens.”); SHKLAR, supra note 57, at 2-3 (contrasting slavery to voting,
and arguing that “the ballot has always been a certificate of full membership in society,”
an indicator of “social standing” that has the “capacity to confer a minimum of social dig-
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tors used merit-based qualifications, such as literacy tests, understanding and character clauses, property ownership, and poll taxes,
to unfairly secure political power through the exclusion of African
Americans and others.60 The dramatic drop in voter registration and
participation among African Americans in the thirty years following
passage of the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial discrimination in voting illustrates the effectiveness of these tools.61 The percentage of voting-age African Americans who participated in Florida
gubernatorial elections plummeted from 87% in 1884 to just 5% in
1896.62 Just as facially race-neutral poll taxes and literacy tests disseminated the message that African Americans were to be disproportionately excluded from the political process, the Court’s prohibition
on a review of the imperfectly marked ballots, the majority of which
came from the African-American community, conveyed a message of
racial exclusion.63
nity” on those who have it, and describing the vote as “a demand for inclusion in the polity,
an effort to break down excluding barriers to recognition”); Ronald Dworkin, What is
Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (voting is a means by
which a “community confirms an individual person’s membership, as a free and equal citizen . . . .”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710 (1993) (“The primary value underlying the participation cases . . .
is an aspect of . . . civil inclusion: ‘a sense of connectedness to the community and of equal
political dignity; greater readiness to acquiesce in governmental decisions and hence
broader consent and legitimacy’”) (quoting Karlan, Maps and Misreadings, supra note 57,
at 180); see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993); David M. Estlund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in
Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1437 (1993); Miriam Galston, Taking
Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REV. 331 (1994).
60. See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543 (1965) (“The Virginia poll tax was
born of a desire to disenfranchise the Negro.”); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW § 4.4.1-.2, at 191-93 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing white primaries); SAMUEL
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 78 (1998); see also J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS:
SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910
(1974); Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV.
523, 524 (1973); Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering
the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389, 397 (1985) (observing that “[i]n the South,
state and local governments began to use gerrymandering, poll taxes, literacy tests, ‘grandfather clauses,’ white primaries, malapportionment, residency requirements, property
ownership requirements, fraud, and violence to bring about the total disenfranchisement of
Black voters”).
61. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 60, at 68.
62. KOUSSER, supra note 60, at 91-103 (discussing the racially exclusionary impact of
Florida poll taxes and eight-box provisions designed to disenfranchise illiterate African
Americans, and the decline in African-American voter turnout); see also Katz, supra note
43, at 512-13 n.117 (discussing the expressive harm generated by post-Reconstruction disenfranchisement and citing LEON F. LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE
AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 531-556 (1979), and GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, GENDER AND
JIM CROW 123-24 (1996)).
63. The Court was complicit in the messages of disenfranchisement sent to African
Americans in the 1800s and early 1900s. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (denying
jurisdiction of a federal court over claim brought by African-American resident of Alabama
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The Court’s use of merit-based criteria also has special meaning
in light of recent controversies regarding affirmative action. As in the
affirmative action context, some might interpret the Court’s reliance
on merit with regard to the law of democracy simply as a pretext to
exclude African Americans, or at least as a misplaced set of priorities
in which seemingly neutral criteria are valued over the presence and
participation of Americans from all backgrounds in public institutions.64 Indeed, merit has been used as an argument to invalidate
race-conscious measures that secure the political rights of historically disadvantaged voters.65
Some might claim that the merit-based vision sends the message
that “voters must follow the rules of voting.” Such a message, however, loses its appeal when one recognizes that Florida officials included many votes that did not comply with a literal and generally
undisputed interpretation of the law, including but not limited to improperly submitted absentee votes.66 Recognizing this inconsistency,
one message of the Court interpreted through the lens of race is that
“members of politically disfavored groups must follow the rules of
voting.” Another possible message, the substance of which is consistent with merit-based criteria, conveys that “those with the foresight,
to compel local board of registrars to enroll his name upon the voting lists of the county);
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (concluding that literacy tests do not facially
discriminate on the basis of race and do not violate equal protection); United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1875) (invalidating legislation providing for punishment of a
Kentucky election inspector who refused to receive and count the votes of African Americans). But see Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (concluding that Oklahoma
grandfather clause violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
64. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
65. Cf. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (striking down a state law that allowed only native Hawaiians to vote for trustees of public agency that managed programs
designed to benefit native Hawaiians and asserting that “[o]ne of the principal reasons
race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a
person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities”);
Katherine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 621 n.72
(1995) (arguing that “[o]nce we recognize that racial groups are entitled to be represented
as racial groups, we are well on our way to enthroning group fairness, rather than individual merit, as the basis for all societal decisions”). But cf. Tucker, supra note 29, at 454-55
(describing the “merit-based approach” of critics of affirmative action as inappropriate in
the voting rights context).
66. Cf. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000) (holding
that a county supervisor’s decision to allow representatives of one political party to add information to absentee ballot request forms in violation of Florida law did not invalidate requests); David Barstow & Don Van Natta Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 1 (reporting that “[u]nder intense pressure from the Republicans, Florida officials accepted hundreds of overseas absentee ballots
that failed to comply with state laws”). While some might assert that the neutrality of a
merit-based vision of democracy is necessary when resolving a disputed election (as opposed to prospectively setting forth the processes for running an election), the selective application of merit-based criteria establishes the transparency of such neutrality.
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determination, resources, and skill to manipulate rules will be rewarded.”
The lens of race also exposes the democratic instability that arises
from the expressive harm of exclusion. Whereas an inclusionary vision conveys government’s respect for all of its citizens and lends legitimacy to government decisions, the same cannot be said about the
merit-based vision. A political victory based on merit-based assumptions sends an exclusionary message that undermines the confidence
necessary to ensure the voluntary consent of citizens. In such an atmosphere, it is even more difficult to build coalitions, accommodate
diverse viewpoints in political discourse and government policy, and
engage in constructive dialogue across racial lines.67 Reconciliation
and healing are almost impossible because African Americans have
not been fully included in decisionmaking.68
Instability in the wake of exclusion arises not only from the perceived illegitimacy of political results, but also from the perceived illegitimacy of the institutions that led to those results.69 African
Americans overwhelmingly vote against conservative politicians, and
five Justices appointed by Republican presidents prohibited the
counting of thousands of ballots, the majority of which were from African-American precincts.70 The perception that the Court attempted
to secure its political objectives by ignoring the political choices of African Americans is potentially destabilizing.71 It taps into a reservoir
67. Cf. Guinier, supra note 6, at 131 (“Exclusion of a racial or language minority
group exposes a deep fissure in the American democratic bargain, which purportedly reconciles majoritarian preferences with minority interests.”).
68. Cf. Guinier, supra note 59, at 285 (“A transformative politics would also ensure
government legitimacy because it would give disadvantaged groups a substantive basis for
lending their consent to government decisions.”).
69. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“And, above
all, in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a public
treasure. . . . [W]e do risk a self-inflicted wound—a wound that may harm not just the
Court, but the Nation.”).
70. Others might raise suspicions about the Florida Supreme Court’s political motives
in including the undervotes. In the context of history which has excluded African Americans from political, educational, and economic spheres, however, the high federal court’s
message of exclusion may convey a message to some that extends past mere political posturing.
71. Others, including but not limited to the Justices themselves, have addressed
whether political motivations influenced the Court. Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at
128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although we may never know with complete certainty the
identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule
of law.”), and William Marshall, The Supreme Court, Bush v. Gore, and Rough Justice, 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 787 (2001) (accepting that the Court’s decision was political, and inquiring as to whether it was appropriate), and Ginsburg Recalls Florida Recount Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at A25 (reporting that Justice Ginsburg stated that “[w]hatever
final judgment awaits Bush v. Gore in the annals of history, I am certain that the good
work and good faith of the U.S. federal judiciary as a whole will continue to sustain public
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of suspicion among African Americans that they do not count as citizens within the political community.72 The indifference of others who
either rationalize or idly tolerate such exclusion only compounds the
anger, resentment, and frustration felt by those who are excluded.73
In effect, the merit-based vision’s message of exclusion can promote
racial distrust and detachment, factionalism, and political instability
generally.74
III. MERIT AND THE EXCLUSION OF US ALL
The problems associated with the merit-based vision are especially visible through the lens of race due to the unique interaction of
history, political identity, and race in the United States. While racial
confidence at a level never beyond repair”), with Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111 (“None are
more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the members of this Court,
and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution’s design to leave the selection of the
President to the people, through their legislatures, and to the political sphere.”), and Bill
Rankin, The Ruling: Was it Politics? That, Too, is in Dispute, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec.
14, 2000, at 2B (reporting that in response to questions about political motives of the Court
following Bush v. Gore, Justice Thomas stated that one should not “apply the rules of the
political world” to the Court, that the Justices “have no axes to grind” but simply protect
the Constitution, and that he had never heard any discussion “of partisan politics among
members of the court”).
72. Cf. Lawrence D. Bobo, Michael C. Dawson, & Devon Johnson, Enduring TwoNess, PUB. PERSP., May/June 2001, at 12 (reporting the results of the National African
American Election Survey that show blacks are politically alienated even when compared
to white Democrats).
73. Cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 111 (1992) (“Isn’t this the point of Invisible Man . . . where Ralph Ellison depicts
blacks as a category of human beings whose suffering is so thoroughly ignored that they,
and it, might as well not exist?”) (citing RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 261-80 (1972));
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 56 (1991) (observing that invisibility results from “not being part of the larger cultural picture”); Martin Luther King,
Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 835, 843 (1993) (“We
will have to repent in this generation not merely for the hateful words and actions of the
bad people but for the appalling silence of the good people.”).
74. As recently as 1997, the Court recognized that “[s]tates . . . have a strong interest
in the stability of their political systems,” and political stability has most often been invoked to justify ballot access laws that favor the two major parties to the disadvantage of
other parties. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997) (“States
also have a strong interest in the stability of their political systems.”); Rutan v. Republican
Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The stabilizing effects of such
a [two-party] system are obvious.”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 144-45 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
There can be little doubt that the emergence of a strong and stable two-party
system in this country has contributed enormously to sound and effective government. The preservation and health of our political institutions, state and
federal, depends to no small extent on the continued vitality of our two-party
system, which permits both stability and measured change.
Id.; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (“Splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage to the fabric of government. It appears obvious to us
that the [provision at issue] furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system. We also consider that interest as not only permissible, but compelling . . . .”) (citations
omitted).
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disadvantage in and of itself warrants concern, it is also important to
note that the vulnerability of African Americans to the Court’s remedy serves as a diagnostic tool that exposes structural faults in a
merit-based vision of democracy that impact others.75
Many Americans of various backgrounds, including but not limited to the elderly, the poor, the language and religious minorities,
and the disabled, use voting as a means to maintain communities of
identity and to exert collective self-determination in shaping their
world through the political process.76 Exclusionary, merit-based assumptions about democracy that ignore context and history interfere
with the ability of these Americans to identify with one another and
ally themselves with others in the political sphere.77 Further, a diverse group of Americans suffer the expressive harms associated
with an exclusionary, merit-based vision of democracy, whether the
message is “you are too old and senile to vote,” or “English is our
primary language,” or “you are poor and don’t deserve the same
equipment as other voters.”
By confronting merit-based assumptions about democracy embedded in the majority’s reasoning in Bush v. Gore, one discovers that
there is more to fix in American democracy than vote-counting machinery. Indeed, a focus on better machines and more uniformity may
push other, more weighty questions about the meaning of democracy
to the background. Significant disparities in participation and even
the counting of votes are likely to continue under a system of formal
equality that fails to account for context-specific barriers to political
inclusion.78 Some commentators may make seemingly persuasive ar75. Cf. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 6 (manuscript at 1):
Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner’s canary. It is easy
enough to think that when we sacrifice this canary the only harm is to communities of color. Yet if those who are racially marginalized do function as the
miner’s canary, others ignore problems that converge around racial minorities
at their own peril. We are ignoring the symptoms that tell us we are all being
poisoned.
Id.
76. Cf. KOUSSER, supra note 60, at 49 (noting that poll taxes and literacy tests disenfranchised poor whites in addition to African Americans).
77. See Dana Canedy, Vote Spices Up Bubbling Ethnic Stew, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2000, at A13 (describing similarities between Jews and African Americans in Florida, and
reporting that many “elderly Jewish voters in Palm Beach County said confusing ballots
had caused them to mistakenly vote for Patrick J. Buchanan . . . who is perceived by some
as anti-Semitic” and that many Jews “believe they lost out on a chance to elect the first
Jewish vice president”).
78. For example, a state might provide matching funds to every county for the purchase of optical scanner voting systems. This proposal, however, might fail to result in
meaningful inclusion and might even increase racial disparities, as poorer counties might
not be able to afford the systems. Similarly, every county might have optical scanners, but
the majority of spoiled ballots might still come from precincts of color. Rather than responding with indifference to these situations, reasoning that every voter had an equal opportunity, decisionmakers should seek strategies that maximize inclusion. Cf. Jordan,
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guments that educational and economic markets should reward compliance with uniform merit-based criteria with no regard for context
or history.79 With regard to democratic exchange and governance,
however, the need for commitment from a diverse, broad base of perspectives suggests that we should not limit political community with
narrow, merit-based assumptions.80
In challenging the merit-based vision, perhaps the most difficult
questions ask how far courts and legislatures should go to promote
inclusion. Should decisionmakers consider every context-specific issue that impacts any individual in interpreting and restructuring
election laws? At what point does this analysis become too unmanageable and impracticable?
These questions reflect inevitable tensions between administrative convenience on the one hand and important substantive values
related to inclusiveness and participation on the other. This Article
does not purport to identify the proper place to draw a bright line between the two, as further discussion is necessary to determine how to
balance the competing values. It is clear, however, that mechanical
rules that prioritize administrative convenience over a meaningful
view of participation value the time of administrators over citizens’
interests in democratic inclusion. Administrative convenience alone
cannot be the primary basis of a democracy that purports to reflect
the will of the people.81
CONCLUSION
Examining race allows us to see more clearly the shortcomings of
merit-based assumptions of democracy harbored by the majority in
supra note 60, at 397 (noting that majority rule and formal equality through the
Fourteenth Amendment “have created havens for racial and political gerrymandering,
while at the same time providing inadequate protection for the rights of representation of
Blacks and other discrete and insular minorities”).
79. See, e.g., STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND
WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 171-80, 393-461 (1997) (criticizing affirmative action
programs); see also SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF
RACE IN AMERICA (1990).
80. Cf. ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 242 (1987) (admitting that
“[a] white denied a seat on a city council cannot claim entitlement on the ground of ‘merit.’
. . . Qualification for office is not measured by meritocratic standards in the customary
sense”); Karlan & Levinson, supra note 44, at 1202 (arguing that “the Court’s attempt to
integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to affirmative action is both misguided and incoherent . . . because government decisionmaking with respect to voting, at
least in its functional sense of rationing and apportioning the power to govern, is different
from other governmental decisionmaking”); Tucker, supra note 29, at 454-55 (criticizing
the merit-based approach as applied to voting, distinguishing redistricting from employment, contracting, and college admissions decisions).
81. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351 (1972) (“States may not casually deprive
a class of individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to the
State.” (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965))).
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Bush v. Gore, and to understand why this limited vision of democracy
inadequately protects the political rights of racial minorities and
other Americans as well. By conditioning political participation on
the capacity to create a machine-readable ballot, the merit-based vision interferes with the ability of groups of voters to identify with one
another in order to form a political community, create alliances with
others of different backgrounds, and use the vote to enact political
change. The merit-based vision also conveys an expressive harm of
exclusion that may lead to democratic instability. Improved dialogue
and a more comprehensive understanding of democratic visions and
election procedures generally, as well as Bush v. Gore specifically,
require the integration of race as an important analytical tool.

